Abstract-Current researches on UHF RFID system security mainly focus on protecting communication safety and information privacy between a pair of specific tag and its corresponding interrogation reader. However, in many scenarios, instead of stealing detailed private information of tags, adversaries aim at estimating the cardinality of tags, which is called counting attack. Unfortunately, most existing protocols are vulnerable to counting attack. To defend against this attack, in this paper we propose ACSP, a novel Anti-Counting Security Protocol. ACSP employs session identifier and provides a corresponding authentication metric to verify the commands sent by the reader. To handle counting attack, ACSP periodically updates the session identifier, and securely identifies tags with encryption. We evaluate the performance of ACSP through theoretical analysis and qualitative comparison. Results show that ACSP can efficiently withstand counting attack while being able to defend against regular security threats as existing protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ultra high frequency Radio Frequency Identification (UHF RFID) is an advanced technology for non-tangent automatic identification, which is widely used in retailing, logistics, etc. It provides advantages such as non-line-of-sight operation, higher inventory rates, and rewritable memory [1] . A complete RFID system is mainly composed of tags, one or more readers and corresponding backend systems. Each UHF RFID tag, without battery applied, is assigned with a unique ID. And the RFID reader collects tag's information through wireless communication.
RFID tags are usually attached to entities (objects or persons), and the entities can be identified by accessing the tags. Thus, adversaries can identify or trace their targets via illegally accessing the related tags. Towards this end, the adversaries usually hinder normal communication and steal private information (e.g. tag ID) by eavesdropping, mimicking or cloning one communication side, playing as man-in-themiddle, etc. Four typical security threats are summarized by Rieback in [2] : i) sniffing: adversaries obtain tag IDs by eavesdropping back-scatter messages from tags; ii) tracking: adversaries track target's movement through observing the messages attached tag responds; iii) spoofing: in applications like supermarket burglary-resist system, thieves mimic legal RFID tags by writing proper data and ID information into a blank tag, and then remove the original tag attached to stolen goods. Such cloned tag attack has already been implemented in [3] ; iv) replay attack: adversaries play as men-in-the-middle in order to intercept and retransmit reader's queries. By this means, an illegal reader could camouflage itself as an authentic one to communicate with tags.
Generally, the computing capability of passive tags is rather low due to the no built-in battery design. As a result, regular encryption techniques and security protocols are infeasible for RFID system, especially on the tag side. Therefore, challengeresponse model is introduced to solve this problem. In this model, the reader first challenges the tag for identification. The tag then responds to the challenge and challenges the reader for authentication. Finally, the reader responds to finish the procedure.
Based on the challenge-response model, Molnar proposed a security protocol used in library RFID system [4] named PRF private authentication protocol which uses pseudo-random functions to encrypt communication messages. Henrici advanced hash-based ID variation protocol which implements ID update operation in [5] , and improved this protocol in [6] . The new protocol is so called Hash Chain and it greatly simplifies the hash-based ID variation protocol. Moreover, Kulseng [7] elaborated how to realize security protocol via utilizing physical properties of tag's circuits. On the other side, Molnar [8] and Dimitiou [9] discussed the method to improve the search efficiency when the reader attempts to find the exact ID value of the communicating tag in system applied with security protocols. They mainly used binary tree structure to manage tag's IDs. Lu [10] proposed SPA protocol which implements tag ID update in this type of protocol. In [11] , Lu further improved this protocol via utilizing spare tree structure to break the connection of IDs among each tag. These works mainly focus on how to protect the privacy and security of individual communication, which means providing a security tunnel between the reader and the tag.
Consider the following scenarios: in a warehouse, each piece of merchandise is attached with one tag which keeps a unique ID for automatic identification. A corporate spy may sneak into the warehouse and rapidly get stock information like the amount of goods, by using a handhold reader to count the number of tag. We define counting attack as attacker's behavior of counting the number of objects through estimating cardinality of attached tags. Although the attacker probably could not understand identification messages and authentication messages secured by security protocols, by observing communication messages between the readers and tags or mimic as an authentic reader to probe tags, they still can conduct such attack. Such security concern also exists in vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) systems, such as [12] , if they adopt RFID devices for IFF [13] .
To achieve counting attack, adversaries could apply either framed slotted ALOHA method or tree-based method. For the ALOHA method, the reader first broadcasts the initialization message to set the frame size (slot number), and then each tag picks a slot to reply based on a specific probability distribution. The reader can repeat this procedure several times and estimate the tag cardinality by analyzing reply information. For treebased method, the reader identifies each tag like traversing a tree, in which root node represents the whole tag set and each leaf node indicates a specific tag. Hence, although adversaries may not understand the encrypted messages, they still can conduct counting attack.
In order to defend against counting attack towards RFID system, we propose a novel security protocol ACSP (AntiCounting Security Protocol). ACSP is designed to secure the whole system via protecting two main phases in RFID system: SELECTION and LOCATION. Compared with existing security protocols, ACSP provides overall security of system besides individual privacy. Our contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We define a new security threat toward UHF RFID system named counting attack, which might seriously threaten the system security.
• We propose a security protocol ACSP which can effectively defend against this attack while providing regular security features. We evaluate the performance of ACSP through theoretical analysis and qualitative comparison. Results show that ACSP can efficiently withstand counting attack while being able to defend against regular security threats as existing protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes fundamentals of RFID system, cardinality estimation approaches and counting attack. In Section 3, we propose a novel security protocol ACSP. Section 4 analyzes ACSP, and section 5 is the discussion of ACSP. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
II. FUNDAMENTALS

A. UHF RFID System Protocol
Among many existing works, we take the prevalent EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 (C1G2) specification [14] as an example to demonstrate UHF RFID system model and its security weakness.
The C1G2 physical layer protocol defines a series of physical options for both up-link and down-link. The communication procedure is specified in the MAC layer section. In this paper, we mainly focus on MAC layer protocol of C1G2 specification. The communication model is called Reader Talk First, in which a Framed Slotted Aloha [15] like protocol is used. To identify a specific tag, the reader executes the following two phases : i) SELECTION, the reader sets the frame size and sends a Select command containing mask bits indicating which tag should reply; ii) LOCATION, the reader sends a Query / QueryRepeat / QueryAdjust command to start a new slot. If the selected tag decides to reply in this slot, it responds with a 16-bits random number upon receiving the slot start command. The reader echoes an ACK if no collision happens, and then the tag replies its ID information (EPC) for identification upon successfully receiving the ACK. Otherwise the reader starts another new slot or ends this frame. The details of the whole procedure are elaborated in [14] .
The frame size determined in SELECTION phase is a critical parameter to RFID system performance. On one side, short frames lead to more reply collisions, and thus the reader will need more rounds to identify all tags. On the other side, long frames might force the reader to spend more unnecessary time on no-reply slots. Schoute [16] showed that the optimum occurs when the number of slots is equal to the number of tags.
B. Cardinality Estimation Approaches
As mentioned in Section 2.A, frame size greatly affects system performance. ALOHA scheme is widely used to find a proper frame size. Kodialam and Nandagopal [17] provided a basic ALOHA method to do cardinality estimation. Suppose the exact number of tag set is t, and the reader initializes the round with frame size f . Let ρ = t/f , and each tag decides which slot to respond uniformly. Let N 0 , N c represent the number of no-reply slots and collision slots respectively, then the expectations of the two values are:
With corresponding variations:
The reader can repeat the SELECTION phase several times to reduce the variation, and then solve the equations to estimate the number of tags. Kodialam [18] proposed a solution to estimate the cardinality of multi-reader system and dynamic change set based on this scheme. Qian [19] increased the accuracy of cardinality estimation in large-scale system via collecting the bitmaps of replies in each reader. Moreover, they improved algorithm performance by supposing the tags' reply follows geometric distribution. Han [20] suggested that algorithm performance can be further improved by analyzing the first reply position in the frame.
Tree-based scheme is another approach aim at directly identifying the whole tag set rapidly. In contrast, this is a deterministic method. The reader probes tags like traversing a binary tree from the top down. The root represents the whole set and each leaf node stands for one specific tag according to tag's ID. Pan and Wu [21] proposed a tree-based algorithm named Smart Trend-Traversal (STT). STT adopts query traversal path (QTP) to indicate the reader probing movement. STT defines three types of nodes in traversal tree: empty node, singleton node and collision node refer to no tags match, one tag match and multiple tags match respectively. Accordingly, three types of traversal movement are applied: 1. For collision node, traverses down by using a longer prefix; 2. For singleton node, moves in the breath-first order to the immediate right node whenever meets collision node; 3. For empty node, moves one level up if no response at right child, otherwise moves horizontally to the right.
C. Approaches to Counting Attack
In order to do counting attack, adversaries can just simply implement algorithms described in Section 2.B, either deterministic or probabilistic schemes. Actually we can abstract both two algorithms perform as three steps: i) the reader determines which tags to probe and sets parameters such as frame size, and then sends commands (e.g. Select and then Query) to start. ii) The reader adjusts pertinent parameters, e.g. the frame size and the mask bits, according to the responses' number and distribution in last slot / frame and then queries the tags repeatedly. iii) The reader makes estimation based on these replies information at the end. We notice that both two algorithms mainly work in SE-LECTION phase, and what they demand is that whether one specific slot is a collision slot, a singleton slot or an empty one, instead of the detailed information contained in back-scatter messages. The aforementioned challenge-response model (as shown in Fig. 1 ) only secures LOCATION phase to prevent the leak of ID information, and neglects the threat towards SELECTION phase. As a result, existing security protocols based on this model cannot withstand counting attack.
III. ANTI-COUNTING SECURITY PROTOCOL
To defend against RFID counting attack, we propose AntiCounting Security Protocol (ACSP). ACSP imports a session identifier (SID) which is used for verifying the validity of reader and communication period. Tags will only respond to query commands with correct SID and reader is required to periodically update SID to ensure freshness of SID. ACSP is composed of SID Update and Tag Identification procedures.
We first define some notations used in the protocol: Rx Pseudo-random number x generated by reader or tags CRC Cyclic redundancy check code of message
One-way hash function with variables x 1 , x 2 SID Session identifier TID Tag identifier MASKVAL Bit mask contained in Select command used for selecting target tag M SG HEADER Header of message which indicates the type of the message, including: 1. U P DSID, SID update command from reader to tag; 2. SELECT , Select command; 3. QU ERY , Query command; 4. IDEN T , identification message from tag, containing TID information; 5. AU T HEN , authentication message from reader; 6. QU ERY REP , QU ERY ADJU ST , commands used for ending current slot.
And the message format is as follows: M SG HEADER Message Content CRC
A. SID Update
This procedure periodically updates SID, which contains two steps: i) The reader generates two random number R 1 and R 2 , and then sends SID update command to notify tags to update SID stored in their local memory. The format of update command is (U P DSID,R 1 , R 2 ,H(R 1 ,SID cur ),CRC). Here SID cur represents the identifier used in current communication session. Due to the property of one-way hash function, SID cur is hard to crack even though R 1 and H(R 1 , SID cur ) are known. As a result, given a specific R 1 and SID cur , a command cannot provide the correct value of H(R 1 , SID cur ) is considered invalid. ii) Each tag checks the value of H(R 1 , SID cur ) and CRC to see whether the command is valid. If yes, they update local SID as SID new =H(R 1 XORR 2 ,SID cur ), where SID new stands for the new SID used in following communication session. Note that SID cur is no longer valid after updating. The whole procedure is shown in Fig. 2 . 
B. Tag Identification
Tag identification procedure provides secured communication and information exchange between the reader and tags. It is also compatible with prevailing industrial system specifications, e.g. EPCglobal C1G2 and ISO 18000-6C.
The reader first determines the target tag by sending encrypted Select command (SELECT , R 3 , H(R 3 , SID), ( MASKVAL XOR SID ), CRC), where R 3 is a random number generated by the reader and SID is the current session identifier. In this command, R 3 and corresponding H(R 3 ,SID) can be regarded as certification information. And the reader uses SID to conceal the real value of MASKVAL. Thus, adversaries are unable to know which tag the reader is interrogating via eavesdropping without correct SID. Then, upon receiving the Select command, the tag checks the included CRC, R 3 and corresponding H(R 3 , SID). If all are correct, the tag gets MASKVAL by calculating (MASKVAL XOR SID) XOR SID = MASKVAL. The tag gets ready to respond if its own ID matches MASKVAL, otherwise keeps silent until receiving the next Select command.
After sending Select command, the reader generates a random number R 4 and sends Query command (QU ERY , R 4 , H(R 4 , SID), CRC). The tags in ready state examine the CRC and correctness of (R 4 , H(R 4 , SID)) in the Query command after receiving it. If they are correct, the ready tags generate a random number R 5 and respond identification messages, (IDEN T , R 5 , H(R 4 , TID), CRC) respectively. If the reader receives the identification message successfully without collision, it will search for the tag's exact TID in database according to R 4 and H(R 4 ,TID). Otherwise, the reader sends (QU ERY REP / QU ERY ADJU ST , R p , H(R p , SID), CRC) to end this slot and start a new one if the frame size is not exceeded. Once the reader finds the TID of the responding tag from database, updates tag's TID as TID new = H(R4 XOR R 5 , TID). Then the reader responds the authentication message, (AU T HEN , H(R 5 , TID), CRC), to inform the tag to update its TID immediately. The tag receiving the authentication message checks H(R 5 , TID). If it is correct, its ID will be replaced with H(R 4 XOR R 5 , TID), otherwise it does nothing. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of ACSP in this section. According to [22] , systems working in wireless environment are vulnerable to security threats, especially the RFID system whose computing capability is constrained. We first show that ACSP is able to protect the privacy of RFID system against both passive and active attack, e.g. sniffing (eavesdropping), tracking, spoofing, replay attack, as well as counting attack. We then evaluate the overhead of ACSP.
Security Analysis. We first assume that the communication between the reader and the database is secured. The adversary is supposed to fully understand ACSP and has the equipments which can read communication messages and send exactly the same signals as either the reader or tags in legal system. Normally, passive attack in wireless environment refers to eavesdropping, which means attackers can know private information simply via eavesdropping communication messages. For RFID system, tag ID is the critical information in the system. In ACSP, this attack is prevented by encrypted TID using one-way hash function H(x 1 , x 2 ) and a random number. According to the preimage-resistance [23] property of oneway hash function, it is infeasible for attackers to find TID from R x and H(TID, R x ). Note that attackers may guess ID information by analyzing the MASKVAL in Select command before the identification procedure and observing the replies from tags. However, this potential danger is generally ignored in existing literatures. Thus, we require the reader to encrypt the MASKVAL by XORing with SID. The original value of MASKVAL can only be revealed in case SID is known.
Active attacks towards RFID includes tracking, spoofing and replay attack. For tracking attack, ACSP utilizes TID update and random number challenge to defend against illegitimate tracking. These operations ensure that the encrypted TID information H(TID, R 4 ) in reply messages will vary according to the change of the random number. Besides, if successful authentication is made, the tag will update its TID consequently. Thus, attackers can hardly track the tag without seizing the precise value of TID. For spoofing attack, in ACSP, each tag is required to reply identification message containing H(TID, R 4 ), where R 4 is the random number given in Query / QueryRepeat command. This indicates the attacker could hardly generate correct value of H(TID, R 4 ) to deceive the reader without knowing TID. For replay attack, ACSP ask the reader to respond according to the random number in identification message sent by the tag. The tag would not update its TID upon receiving an incorrect authentication message. Moreover, we can make the reader and the tag generate random number differs from the previous one. Each tag keeps copies of the random numbers contained in last received valid SID update command and Query / QueryRepeat command. If the tag receives the same random number as the last one, it consider this command is sent by an attacker.
The most important concern of ACSP is how to prevent the system from counting attack. As mentioned above, attackers do not care about specific tag IDs and their corresponding objects. Nevertheless, common security protocols secure only the identification and authentication messages to protect the privacy of a specific tag and may fail to handle such attack. ACSP provides a simple but efficient way to eliminate the counting threat. If the reader could not give the correct R x , H(R x , SID) pair, tags will simply ignore the command and keep silent until it receives the right one. In addition, MASKVAL is encrypted by XORing with SID to block the attacker from perceiving target tags to estimate the number of tags by observing the replies from tags. An adversary needs to know the SID to forge commands to make tags respond as his will. This situation can hardly occur as the reader periodically updates the SID to protect the attacker from guessing SID by brute-force trials.
Overhead. To implement ACSP, both reader and tags have ACSP PRF [4] Hash Chain [6] Binary Tree Identification [9] SPA [10] a Computation Overhead (Tag) to consume an extra memory space to store SID. Besides, a pseudo-random number generator and hash function logic circuits are required to equip. Fortunately, the state-of-theart electronics industry provides feasible solutions for RFID system, especially at tag side, to realize logic functions, e.g. Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) as random number generator [7] , AES-like algorithm to achieve the effect of oneway hash function [24] etc. We assume each time either the reader or the tag executes XOR / hashing / random number generates operation cost C XOR , C H , C R units of resource respectively. Let n stands for the total number of tag ID stored in backend database. Thus, the overhead of a successful SID update and tag identification procedure in ACSP is illustrated in TABLE I.
We compare ACSP with several representative existing security protocols. Note that computation cost of ACSP includes two procedures as well as Select command, which is rarely mentioned in previous related works. It can be observed from TABLE I that our ACSP has the ability to handle counting attack with acceptable additional system cost.
V. DISCUSSION
We make two assumptions when designing ACSP. In this section we discuss how these assumptions may affect ACSP.
A. No Message Lost in Communication
We assume that no message will be lost in the whole communication procedure. Actually, in real system, signal turbulence and attenuation occurs frequently. In ACSP, message lost may result in de-synchronization between the reader and tags. Because if SID / TID update command are lost, only the reader updates SID / TID while tags do not. As a result, the legal reader cannot communicate with tags in following communication because SIDs / TIDs are no longer matched. To solve this problem, we slightly modify our ACSP as follows. In modified SID update procedure, as showed in Fig. 4 , the reader is required to set a retransmit limit and repeatedly send update command, as described in section 3.1, until no tag responds or the retransmit times reaches the limit. Each tag should respond an ACK message, (U P DACK, R 2 , CRC), upon receiving the valid update command and updates SID stored in its local memory. Note that after the tag updates the TID, it will not reply an ACK message upon receiving the update command which contains the old TID. Here the retransmit limit is mandatory due to the concern of Denial of Attack (DoS), in which adversaries continuously send ACK messages to confuse the reader that there are still tags which have not updated the SID yet.
To solve the message lost problem occurs in tag identification procedure, we let the reader preserve a copy of TID used in last successful identification for each tag. If authentication message is lost in this round and the tag does not update its own TID consequently, the reader can search for the last successful identification TID. This technique has been already implemented in several related work such as [5] [6] .
B. Immune to Physical Attack
Authors in [10] [11] [25] discussed the physical attack, in which attackers might probably steal the tag's ID and other security information via physically compromising the tag and reading the memory. In ACSP, SID will be revealed if the attackers make physical attack to any tags in the system since all tags store the same SID. As a consequence, ACSP will fail to action. Even worse, the attacker can update the SID one step ahead than the legal reader.
However, we do not consider physical attack during designing ACSP, because we believe that attackers may also lack of equipments which can directly read tag's memory. Furthermore, we can apply access password to RFID tags so that if illegal access happens, the tag will automatically selfdestroy. We will discuss protocol design concerned of physical attack in future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current research works on RFID system mainly focus on the methods to protect communication security, especially the privacy of ID information, between one single tag and one specific reader. Unfortunately, most existing protocols are vulnerable to counting attack, which happens frequently in lots of applications. In this paper, we first formally defined counting attack. Then, we proposed ACSP, which is compatible with industrial system specifications and is able to handle counting attack efficiently as well as other common security threats. We evaluated the performance of ACSP through theoretical analysis and qualitative comparison. Results show that ACSP can efficiently withstand counting attack while being able to defend against regular security threats as existing protocols.
